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A SUMMARY OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
DATA: HUMAN FACTORS IMPLICATIONS
Kevin W. Williams, Ph.D.
FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute
Oklahoma City, OK
A review and analysis of unmanned aircraft (UA) accident data was conducted to identify important human factors
issues related to their use. UA accident data were collected from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. The
percentage of involvement of human factors issues varied across aircraft from 21% to 68%. For most of the aircraft
systems, electromechanical failure was more of a causal factor than human error. One critical finding from an
analysis of the data is that each of the fielded systems is very different, leading to different kinds of accidents and
different human factors issues. A second finding is that many of the accidents that have occurred could have been
anticipated through an analysis of the user interfaces employed and procedures implemented for their use. The
current paper summarizes the various human factors issues related to the accidents
Introduction
The review and analysis of unmanned aircraft (UA)
accident data can assist researchers in identifying
important human factors issues related to their use. The
most reliable source for UA accident data currently is
the military. The military has a relatively long history of
UA use and has always been diligent in accurately
recording information pertaining to accidents/incidents.
The purpose of this research was to review all currently
available information on UA accidents and identify
human error aspects in those accidents and what human
factors issues are involved.

Classification of the accident data was a two-step
process. In the first step, accidents were classified into
the categories of human factors, maintenance, aircraft,
and unknown. Accidents could be classified into more
than one category. In the second step, those accidents
classified as human-factors-related were classified
according to specific human factors issues of
alerts/alarms, display design, procedural error, skillbased error, or other. Classification was based on the
stated causal factors in the reports, the opinion of safety
center personnel, and personal judgment of the author.
Results

Two primary sources of accident information were
collected from the U.S. Army. The first was a
summary of 56 UA accidents produced by the U.S.
Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory (Manning,
Rash, LeDuc, Noback, & McKeon, 2004) and
obtained from the U.S. Army Risk Management
Information System (RMIS). The second was a direct
query of the RMIS system of all UA accidents that
occurred between January 1986 and June 2004. A
total of 74 accidents were identified, the earliest of
which occurred on March 2, 1989, and the latest on
April 30, 2004.
Information regarding UA accidents for the U.S. Navy
was collected from the Naval Safety Center. A summary
of 239 UA mishaps occurring between 1986 and 2002
was received from the Naval Safety Center in
Pensacola, FL (Kordeen Kor, personal communication).
Air Force accident/mishap information was collected
from the Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Corps
Web site, http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/. A total of 15
Class-A UA mishaps were retrieved from the Web
site, covering the dates from December 6, 1999, to
December 11, 2003. In addition, a complete accident
investigation board report was received.

There are 5 primary military UA in service currently.
The U.S. Army’s Hunter and Shadow, the U.S.
Navy’s Pioneer, and the U. S. Air Force’s Predator
and Global Hawk. Other systems are being developed
and have undergone testing, such as the Mariner
system for the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy but
sufficient accident data do not exist to warrant
separate analyses of these airframes.
Hunter
The Hunter takes off and lands using an external pilot
(EP), standing next to the runway in visual contact
with the aircraft, and operating a controller that is
very similar to ones used by radio-controlled aircraft
hobbyists. After takeoff and climb out, control of the
aircraft is transferred to an internal pilot (IP),
operating from a ground control station (GCS). The
IP controls the Hunter in a more automated fashion,
by selecting an altitude, heading, and airspeed for the
aircraft using a set of knobs located within the GCS.
For landing, control of the aircraft is transferred from
the GCS back to an EP. A hook located below the
aircraft is used to snag the aircraft on a set of
arresting cables positioned across the runway.
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Data from the Hunter program indicated that 15 of
the 32 accidents (47%) had one or more human
factors issues associated with them. Figure 1 shows
the major causal categories for Hunter accidents.
Note that the percentages add to more than 100%
because some of the accidents were classified into
more than one category.
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issues, alerts and alarms, display design, and crew
procedural error. A pilot-in-command issue is a
situation where the authority of the controlling pilot
is superceded by other personnel in the area, violating
the principle that the pilot of the aircraft has the final
decision-making authority during a flight. In contrast,
alerts and alarms deal with situations where a nonnormal flight condition (e.g., high engine
temperature) is not conveyed effectively to the crew.
Display design issues typically manifest when not all
of the information required for safe flight is conveyed
effectively to the crew.
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Figure 1. U.S. Army Hunter accident causal factors.
Breaking down the human factors issues further,
Table 1 shows how the number and percentage of the
15 human-factors-related accidents are associated
with specific human factors issues. Again,
percentages exceed 100% because of some accidents
being classified under more than one issue.
Table 1. Breakdown of human factors issues for
Hunter accidents.
Issue
Number
Percent
1
7%
Pilot-in-command
2
13%
Alerts and Alarms
1
7%
Display Design
External Pilot Landing
7
47%
Error
External Pilot Takeoff
3
20%
Error
3
20%
Procedural Error
By far the largest human factors issue is the difficulty
experienced by EPs during landings. Forty-seven
percent of the human factors-related Hunter accidents
involved an error by the EP during landing. An
additional 20% of the accidents involved an error by
the EP during takeoff. Control difficulties are at least
partially explainable by the fact that when the aircraft
is approaching the EP the control inputs to maneuver
the aircraft left and right are opposite what they
would be when the aircraft is moving away from the
EP. This cross-control problem is present for any UA
operated by an external pilot via visual contact.
Besides EP control problems, other issues
represented in the table include pilot-in-command

Finally, the crew procedural errors referred to here
involved three occasions where the crew failed to
properly follow established procedures. On one
occasion an improper start-up sequence led to data
link interference from the backup GCS. On another
occasion the crew failed to follow standard departure
procedures and the UA impacted a mountain. On a
third occasion an EP failed to complete control box
checks prior to taking control of the UA and did not
verify a box switch that was in the wrong position.
Shadow
Unlike the Hunter, the Shadow (see Figure 2) does
not use an external pilot, depending instead on a
launcher for takeoffs, and an automated landing
system for recovery. The landing system, called the
tactical automated landing system (TALS) controls
the aircraft during approach and landing, usually
without intervention from the GCS pilot. A cable
system, similar to the one used for the Hunter, is used
to stop the aircraft after landing. Aircraft control
during flight is accomplished by the GCS pilot
through a computer menu interface that allows

Figure 2. U.S. Army Shadow
selection of altitude, heading, and airspeed. During
landing, GCS personnel have no visual contact with
the aircraft, nor do they have any sensor input from
onboard sensors. A command to stop the aircraft
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engine is given by the GCS pilot, who must rely on
an external observer to communicate that the plane
has touched down.
The analysis of Shadow accidents shows a different
pattern from that seen with the Hunter. In contrast to the
Hunter, only 5 of the 24 Shadow accidents (21%) were
attributed to human factors issues. Figure 3 shows the
major causal factors for the Shadow accidents.
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damaged aircraft to kill its engine, but because of
damage to the antenna the command was not
received. That same GCS was then tasked with
controlling a second Shadow that was on an
approach. Unfortunately, after taking control of the
second Shadow, the aircraft received the “engine
kill” command that was still waiting for an
acknowledgment from the GCS software, causing the
second Shadow to crash also. This accident was
classified as both a procedural error, because the
crew failed to follow all checklist items prior to the
transfer of control of the second aircraft, and a
display design problem, because there was not a clear
indication to the crew of the status of the “engine
kill” command that had been issued.
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Figure 3. U.S. Army Shadow accident causal factors.
In addition to the four categories used for the Hunter
accidents, an additional category was added for
Shadow to include failures of the tactical automated
landing system (TALS). While eliminating landing
accidents potentially attributable to an EP, the use of
TALS is not perfect, as shown from the data. Use of
the launcher eliminated any EP takeoff errors for
these aircraft.
Breaking down the human-factors-related accidents,
Table 2 shows the number and percentage of the 5
accidents related to specific human factors issues. As
can be seen from the table, the distribution of issues
is evenly divided across pilot-in-command, alerts and
alarms, display design, and procedural errors. The
percentages sum to greater than 100% because of
multiple attributions for some accidents.
Table 2. Breakdown of human factors issues for
Shadow accidents.
Issue
Number
Percent
Pilot-in-command 2
40%
Alerts & Alarms
2
40%
Display Design
2
40%
Procedural error
2
40%

Like the U.S. Army’s Hunter UA, the Pioneer
requires an EP for takeoff and landing. After takeoff,
the aircraft can be controlled from a GCS in one of
three modes. In the first mode the air vehicle is
operated autonomously and the autopilot uses global
positioning
system
(GPS)
preprogrammed
coordinates to fly the air vehicle to each waypoint. In
the second mode, the IP commands the autopilot by
setting knobs (rotary position switches) to command
airspeed, altitude, compass heading or roll angle, and
the autopilot flies the UA. In the third mode, the IP
flies the aircraft using a joystick. The Pioneer can be
landed at a runway using arresting cables, but
because it is a U.S. Navy/Marine operated aircraft, it
is also landed on board a ship by flying into a net.
There are plans for implementing an automated
landing system for the Pioneer for ship-based
landings.
A list of 239 Pioneer accidents was received from the
Navy Safety Center. Although not providing much
detail, the data did allow a general categorization of
accidents into principle causal categories. Figure 4
shows the major causal factors for Pioneer accidents.
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For both the Hunter and Shadow, at least one
accident involved the transfer of control of the
aircraft from one GCS to another during flight, an
activity unique to UA. In the case of the Shadow, two
aircraft were damaged during a single mission. The
first was damaged due to a TALS failure. After the
accident, the GCS crew issued a command to the
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Figure 4. U.S. Navy Pioneer UA accident causal
factors.
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As can be seen from the figure, human factors-related
issues were present in approximately 28% of the
accidents. Breaking down the human factors-related
accidents further, Table 3 lists the number and
percentage of the 68 accidents related to specific
human factors issues.
Table 3. Breakdown of
Pioneer accidents.
Issue
Aircrew Coordination
Landing Error
Take-off Error
Weather

human factors issues for
Number
9
46
7
6

Percentage
13%
68%
10%
9%

As with the U.S. Army Hunter accidents, the largest
percentage of human factors accidents (68%) was
associated with the difficulty experienced by the EP
while landing the aircraft. An additional 10% of the
accidents were associated with takeoffs, although the
primary means of taking off is through the use of a
launcher (from ship-based aircraft). In addition to
landing and takeoff errors, two other issues seen with
the Pioneer were aircrew coordination, which
includes procedural and communication type errors,
and weather-related accidents, which deal with pilot
decision-making. Unfortunately, details regarding
these accidents were not sufficient to identify issues
beyond this level.
Predator
The Predator made its first flight in June 1994. There
are two Predator types, currently designated as MQ-1
and MQ-9, also called Predator and Predator B. The
Predator aircraft is flown from within the GCS,
similarly to a manned aircraft, using a joystick and
rudder pedals and a forward-looking camera that
provides the pilot with a 30-degree field of view. The
camera is used for both takeoffs and landings.
The Predator accident causal factors are shown in
Figure 5. As can be seen from the figure, human
factors encompass a higher percentage (67%) than
aircraft-related causes, unlike the other aircraft
examined thus far.
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Figure 5. Air Force Predator accident causal factors.
Table 4 shows a breakdown of the human factors
issues associated with Predator accidents. The
majority of human-factors-related problems were
concerned with procedural errors on the part of the
flight crew. One of these accidents involved yet
another problem with a handoff of the aircraft from
one GCS to another. During the handoff, the mishap
crew did not accomplish all of the checklist steps in
the proper order, resulting in turning off both the
engine and the stability augmentation system of the
aircraft. The aircraft immediately entered an
uncommanded dive and crashed.
Table 4. Breakdown of human factors issues for
Predator accidents.
Issue
Number
Percentage
Alerts & Alarms
1
13%
Display Design
2
25%
Landing Error
1
13%
Procedural Error
6
75%
A second procedural error of note occurred when the
pilot accidentally activated a program that erased the
internal random access memory on board the aircraft
during a flight. That this was even possible to do
during a flight is notable in itself and suggests the
relatively ad hoc software development process
occurring for these systems (Tvaryanas, 2004).
Global Hawk
The Global Hawk is the largest and newest of the 5
military systems discussed. The first flight of the
Global Hawk occurred in February 1998, and it
became the first UA to cross the Pacific Ocean in
April 2001 when it flew from the United States to
Australia (Schaefer, 2003).
The Global Hawk is the most automated of all the
systems discussed. All portions of the flight,
including landing and takeoff are pre-programmed
before the flight and the basic task of the crew during
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the flight is simply to monitor the status of the
aircraft and control the payload. While this makes
flying the Global Hawk very simple, the mission
planning process is unwieldy and requires a great
deal of time to accomplish.
Only three accident reports were available for the
Global Hawk. Of these three reports, one did not
provide sufficient information for classification, a
second faulted a failure in a fuel nozzle, which led to an
engine failure, and the third was a human factors issue
centering on the complicated mission planning process.
In that accident, the mishap aircraft suffered an inflight
problem with temperature regulation of the avionics
compartment and landed at a preprogrammed alternate
airport for servicing. After landing, the aircraft was
commanded to begin taxiing. Unknown to the crew, a
taxi speed of 155 knots had been input into the mission
plan at that particular waypoint as a result of a software
bug in the automated mission planning software in use
at the time. The aircraft accelerated to the point where it
was unable to negotiate a turn and ran off of the runway,
collapsing the nose gear and causing extensive damage
to the aircraft.
Conclusions
One conclusion apparent from the data reported here
is that, for most of the systems examined, electrical
and mechanical reliability play as much or more of a
role in the accidents as human error. Mishaps
attributed at least partially to aircraft failures range
from 33% (Global Hawk) to 67% (Shadow) in the
data reported here.
An improvement in electromechanical reliability will
probably come only through an increase in the cost of
the aircraft. However, a reduction of human errors
leading to accidents might not necessarily entail
increased costs if suggested changes can be
incorporated early in the design process. In the
systems analyzed, human factors issues were present
in 21% (Shadow) to 67% (Predator) of the accidents.
These numbers suggest there is room for
improvement if specific human factors issues can be
identified and addressed.
In that regard, it is important to note that many of the
human factors issues identified are very much
dependent on the particular systems being flown. For
example, both the Pioneer and Hunter systems have
problems associated with the difficulty external pilots
have in controlling the aircraft. For both of these
systems, the majority of accidents due to human error
can be attributed to this problem. However, the other
three systems discussed do not use an EP and either

use an IP (Predator) or perform landings using an
automated system (Shadow and Global Hawk).
The designs of the user interfaces of these systems
are, for the most part, not based on previously
established aviation display concepts. Part of the
cause for this is that the developers of these system
interfaces are not primarily aircraft manufacturers.
Another reason is that these aircraft are not “flown”
in the traditional sense of the word. Only one of the
aircraft reviewed (Predator) has a pilot/operator
interface that could be considered similar to a
manned aircraft. For the other UA, control of the
aircraft by the GCS pilot/operator is accomplished
indirectly through the use of menu selections,
dedicated knobs, or preprogrammed routes. These
aircraft are not flown but “commanded.” This is a
paradigm shift that must be understood if appropriate
decisions are to be made regarding pilot/operator
qualifications, display requirements, and critical
human factors issues to be addressed.
If the aircraft is commanded to begin taxiing, there
should be information available regarding the intended
taxi speed. If the aircraft is being handed off from one
station to another, the receiving station personnel should
be aware of what commands will be transmitted to the
aircraft after control is established. Interface
development needs to be focused around the task of the
pilot/operator. For most of these aircraft, that task is one
of issuing commands and verifying that those
commands are accepted and followed. Understanding
this task and creating the interface to support it should
help to improve the usability of the interface and reduce
the number of accidents for these aircraft. This is
especially important as these aircraft begin to transition
to the National Airspace System (NAS), conducting
civilian operations among civilian manned aircraft.
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